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TSUNAMI SWAMPS AID AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY: GOVERNMENT 
WAIVES REQUIREMENTS 
 
Dr Anne Abraham 
University of Wollongong 
 
Following the devastating tsunamis of 26 December 2004, Australians were eager to 
donate money to the relief effort.  An issue for many was identifying a trustworthy 
agency; this could be done through direct knowledge of an organisation, or by 
depending on a the recommendations of a source whose competence and integrity was 
readily accepted.  The Australian government provided this external credibility to the 
34 charities it listed on its official tsunami assistance website.  However, an 
investigation of these agencies and the actual appeals conducted by them, indicates 
that the Government may have waived its normal requirements by moving away from 
its two accountability programs, AusAID and ACFID accreditation. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On 26 December 2004 a massive earthquake in the Indian Ocean off the northern 
Indonesian island of Sumatra caused a series of tsunamis across the Bay of Bengal, 
taking more than 230,000 lives and destroying villages, towns and livelihoods in 
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, India, the Maldives, Malaysia, Myanmar, the 
Seychelles, Bangladesh, Kenya and Somalia.  
 
By 5 January, 10 days after the tsunamis struck, Australians had donated $100 million 
towards the relief effort. ABC Online (2005b) reported that “the world is beginning its 
biggest-ever aid effort to help millions of victims of the Asian tsunami. Australians 
who wish to assist can donate to appeals launched by Australian aid agencies. 
Agencies are seeking cash donations to enable them to locally source food, medicine 
and shelter.” However, potential donors needed to be aware that not all post-tsunami 
appeals for help were genuine since “scammers often ride current affairs to add 
legitimacy to their plea” (Maslog-Levis 2005b, p. 2). As with the scam attempts that 
surfaced after the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, the 
tsunami’s devastation, according to research analyst Jonathan Penn,  “is a good 
opportunity for the criminals out for a quick buck, and it’s something that people are 
going to respond to” (Reuters 2005). In the face of a number of fraudulent 
collections,1 Australian donors wanted to know to whom they could donate with 
certainty that their money would reach those affected. 
 
In normal circumstances, potential donors may rely on the antecedents of commitment 
and trust (Morgan and Hunt 1994) to determine the agencies to which they would 
donate.  However, in a crisis situation, this trust be may be transferred to a third party 
perceived to be trustworthy because of a belief in its competence and integrity (Boyd 
2003) and, subsequently, to the collection agencies it recommends. This occurred in 
the case of the Australian government, which established a “Tsunami Assistance” 
website to provide information for potential donors on how to help. The website 
stated: “The Australian Government is working closely with domestic and 
international aid agencies to respond to the magnitude of the December 2004 
Tsunami. It welcomes the generous level of cooperation which has been extended and 
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the donations which have been made to various appeals. The most effective form of 
assistance which can be offered by members of the public wishing to help is a cash 
donation to the charity of their choice” (COA 2005a).  
 
This was followed by a list of 29 hyperlinks which was enlarged a few days later to 
include 342 hyperlinks to the aid agencies shown in Table 1 (COA 2005b). However, 
there was no indication of how these agencies were selected, beyond the statement 
that they had launched appeals. Nevertheless, the public acceptability of these 
organisations was emphasised by the statement that “we advise people raising money 
to arrange with one of the larger and already approved funds to collect money on their 
behalf. The larger funds would be able to supply receipt books and they already have 
the various prudential controls in place” (COA 2005a). 
 
 
TABLE 1: AID AGENCIES LISTED ON OFFICIAL AUSTRALIAN 
GOVERNMENT TSUNAMI ASSISTANCE WEBSITE  
(as at 25 January 2005) 
ADRA Australia International Fund for Animal Welfare 
Anglicord Medecins Sans Frontieres Australia 
Archbishop's Appeal Unit Tsunami 
Appeal 
Muslim Aid Australia 
Austcare National Council of Churches in Australia 
Assisi Aid Projects Opportunity International Australia 
Australia for UNHCR Oxfam - Community Aid Abroad 
Australian Foundation for the Peoples of 
Asia and the Pacific 
Plan Australia 
Australian Red Cross Royal Thai Consulate General Sydney, 
Tsunami Appeal 
Baptist World Aid Australia Salvation Army 
CARE Australia Save the Children 
Caritas Australia Sri Lanka Association of NSW 
CCF Australia Sri Lanka Society of Queensland Inc 
Christian Blind Mission International TEAR Australia 
Compassion Australia Thai Disaster Fund Victoria 
Forgotten Children Rescue Foundation UNICEF 
Friends of the Earth (Australia) Union Aid Abroad 
International Committee of the Red Cross World Vision Australia 
 
 
This raises the question of the nature of the prudential controls to which the site 
referred and how the government knew they were in place. Two Australian 
accreditation sources may have provided this assurance — AusAID and the Australian 
Council for International Development (ACFID). AusAID was established by the 
Australian government to accredit overseas aid agencies and provide the Australian 
public with confidence that accredited agencies are “professional, well managed, 
community-based organisations that are capable of delivering quality development 
outcomes” (COA 2004). ACFID is “the coordinating body for Australian non-
government overseas aid agencies” which “agree to conduct their activities with 
integrity, transparency and accountability” (ACFID 2007). 
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Compliance with the ACFID Code of Conduct is monitored by the Code of Conduct 
Committee, which consists of an independent chairperson, six representatives elected 
from member aid agencies and a representative of donors nominated by the Australian 
Consumers' Association. Compliance is monitored by investigation of complaints and 
by monitoring of annual reports. Thus, although the code also describes “minimum 
fundraising and marketing requirements” to which signatories must conform (ACFID 
2004b), observance of these is not checked. However, for donors, compliance with 
these requirements may form the basis of trust in the organisations, and be consistent 
with Morgan and Hunt's (1994) assertion that trust is present “when one party has 
confidence in an exchange partner's reliability and integrity” (Morgan and Hunt 1994, 
p. 23). Since trust cannot coexist with guarantees (Nissenbaum 1999), it is necessarily 
accompanied by risk (Seligman 1997).  However, risk is something over which 
donors should be able to maintain control by being able to choose whether to accept it 
or avoid donating in the face of excessive risk. Without adequate information, it is 
difficult for donors to make this decision. Further, the literature suggests that although 
donors support the mission of aid agencies, not all trust the organisations that are 
actually carrying out these missions (Robinson 2003). Since “trusters seek evidence of 
trustworthiness” (Boyd 2003, p. 399), the development of trust is related to the 
demonstration of accountability (Robinson 2003, Sargeant and Lee 2004, Tonkiss and 
Passey 1999). 
 
 
COMMITMENT, TRUST AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
At the heart of Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) original commitment-trust model is the 
belief that commitment to give is driven by trust and that trust itself is driven by 
shared values and communication. They further conceptualised trust in terms of the 
organisation's reliability and integrity, concluding that trust is based on the donor's 
observed actions of an organisation together with their perceived future behaviour. 
Thus, it is important that there is clear communication involving the sharing of 
meaningful and timely information (Holdford and White 1997). Indeed, non-profit 
organisations must maintain donor trust “in order to raise the funds necessary to fulfil 
their missions” (Kelley and Anderson 2006, p. 21) and trust itself is “an outcome of 
ongoing processes and practices of accountability” (Roberts 2001, p. 1549).  
 
Non-profit accountability has been defined as “compliance with the institutional 
mission” (Sasso 2003, p. 1487) and it has been suggested that aid agencies are 
accountable not only to their donors, but also to aid recipients, aid partners and the 
general public (Foreman 1999, Churchill 2003, Brown and Moore 2001). 
Accountability should focus on both efficiency and results and can be considered at 
three distinct levels: fiscal, process and program (Drucker 1992, Quarter and 
Richmond 2001, Martin and West 2003, Quarter et al  2003). Fiscal accountability 
documents how funds are spent and addresses stewardship issues. Process 
accountability focuses on how the agency carries out its stated activities. Program 
accountability (which includes social accountability) embraces how the aid is 
delivered and to whom. As non-profit organisations demonstrate accountability and 
promote standards of excellence in management, “higher trust can only follow” (Light 
2002, p. 9).  
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The recent calls for increased non-profit accountability (Maude 1999, Brown and 
Moore 2003, Churchill 2003, Kelley and Anderson 2006, Light 2002, Ospina et al 
2002, Robinson 2003) have led to the emergence of a number of “watchdog” 
organisations which are “rolling out programs to evaluate and accredit nonprofit 
groups” (Silverman 2004: D1). The authority and legitimacy of these organisations in 
accrediting and monitoring non-profit agencies can be assessed in terms of the 
standards they develop and whether these align with generally accepted guidelines for 
financial management, control and accountability. 
 
Two independent US watchdog organisations, the Council of Better Business Bureaus 
and the National Charities Information Bureau, have established standards addressing 
public accountability, fundraising practices and use of donated funds (Howe 2000).  
These bodies regularly review non-profit organisations throughout the US and issue 
statements indicating the extent of compliance with these standards. Another US 
organisation, GuideStar, asserts that “being a good giver takes more than just heart” 
(GuideStar 2005) and provides 10 pieces of advice to potential donors.  In relation to 
accountability, GuideStar declares that “a reputable organization will define its 
mission and programs clearly, have measurable goals and use concrete criteria to 
describe its achievements”.  Similarly, the Evangelical Council for Financial 
Accountability (ECFA) states that “good charities willingly answer tough questions” 
(ECFA 2005b) and claims that while all non-profit organisations believe in 
accountability, ECFA is able to provide assurance to potential donors, because its 
members “have acted upon that belief by voluntarily submitting to the ECFA 
Standards of Responsible Stewardship and demonstrating their compliance through an 
annual review process” (ECFA 2005a).  
 
As previously indicated, two bodies in Australia provide accreditation of aid agencies 
— AusAID and ACFID. AusAID accreditation by the Australian government “acts as 
a front-end risk management process and ensures accountable use of funding” (COA 
2007). It is undertaken by a team consisting of a financial systems assessor and two 
independent development consultants contracted by AusAID who assess the agency 
against agreed accreditation criteria to determine whether it “has the minimum 
necessary and sufficient financial systems to manage Commonwealth funds 
effectively” (COA 2007). 
 
One criteria for AusAID accreditation is being a signatory to ACFID’s code of 
conduct (ACFID 2005a), thus providing ACFID with the authority and legitimacy of 
the Australian Government.  This code “defines standards of governance, 
management, financial control and reporting with which non-government 
development organisations (NGDOs) should comply. It identifies mechanisms to 
ensure accountability in NGDO use of public monies. The Code aims to maintain and 
enhance standards throughout the NGDO community, ensuring public confidence in: 
the integrity of individuals and organisations comprising the NGDO community; and 
quality and effectiveness of NGDO programs” (ACFID 2004a, p. 1). 
 
It was suggested that donors to the tsunami appeal “should ensure that money goes 
only to those agencies committed to complying with the Australian Council for 
International Development’s [ACFID] code of ethics” (Matheson 2005). Similarly, 
Graham Tupper, chief executive of ACFID, told The Australian that “the best way to 
avoid frauds was to give to recognised charities which were listed on the ACFID 
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website” (Granger 2005). In addition, Myles McGregor-Lowndes, director of 
Queensland University of Technology’s Centre for Philanthropy and Non-Profit 
Studies, was able to assure The Courier-Mail that “Australia’s overseas aid 
organisations are up there with the best — if not the best — for having safeguards in 
place. The level of accountability and scrutiny is pretty enormous” (Thomas and 
Thompson 2005).   
 
This gives rise to two issues. The first issue is whether the aid agencies which were 
given implicit approval by the Australian government as a consequence of being 
included in their list on the official tsunami website were accredited by ACFID, thus 
providing potential donors with a basis for trust (Boyd 2003, MacMillan et al 2005). 
The second issue is whether the agencies actually complied with the requirements of 
the ACFID code. These issues provide the basis for the research questions in this 
study.   
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Membership of ACFID provides initial credibility for an aid agency. Further 
accreditation is necessary for agencies to receive AusAID NGO status, thus providing 
additional evidence of appropriate risk management strategies and accountability 
processes. The study investigates whether an agency is a member of ACFID and also 
whether it is an accredited AusAID organisation by asking the questions:   
 
RQ 1a: Did the agency have ACFID accreditation? 
 
RQ 1b: Did the agency have AusAID accreditation? 
 
Section 5.5 of the ACFID Code of Conduct requires: “Donations shall be used as 
promised or implied in fundraising appeals or as requested by the donor. When 
funding is invited from the general public for a specific purpose, the Organisation 
shall have a plan for handling any excess and shall make this known as part of the 
appeal” (ACFID 2004a, p. 4). 
  
From this arise two questions: 
 
RQ 2: Did the agency provide details of the projects for which the donations would be 
used? 
 
RQ 3: Did the agency indicate where excess donations would be channelled once the 
projects or programs have been accomplished?  
 
Addressing this section of the code, ACFID’s Graham Tupper stated that “donors 
have a right to know how the money is spent” (Thomas and Thompson 2005), so the 
fourth research question is: 
 
RQ 4: Did the agency specify the percentage of total donations that will actually go 
overseas and the percentage that will be used on administration? 
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On 25 January 2005, Oxfam New Zealand released an eight-page brief titled 
“Learning the Lessons of the Tsunami — One Month On” which was largely centred 
on Oxfam’s work in the tsunami-devastated regions. The brief presented six lessons. 
The first of these was that “survivors need appropriate aid, not any aid” and that 
“some of the aid provided has not been appropriate” because there is “the need to ask 
people what they want” (Oxfam NZ 2005, p. 1).  Considering this together with 
section 5.1 of the ACFID code which requires organisations to use “reporting 
mechanisms which facilitate accountability to members, donors and the general 
public” (ACFID 2004a, p. 4), it is important to investigate the nature of aid agency 
feedback about the use of the donated funds, which prompts the fifth research 
question: 
 
RQ 5: What feedback was provided by the agency?  
 
The easiest way for the general public to source information regarding the financial 
and social accountability of aid agencies, particularly in a time of crisis, is through aid 
agency websites.  Thus this investigation of the research questions is based largely on 
a review of these websites as provided through the 34 hyperlinks listed on the 
Australian government website.  Supplemental information is also drawn from the 
AusAID and ACFID websites and from the three financial reports on the tsunami 
appeal which were published by ACFID in 2004 and 2005. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
RQ 1: ACFID and AusAID accreditation 
The list of agencies that appeared on the Australian government’s Tsunami Assistance 
website was preceded by the statement: “The most effective form of assistance which 
can be offered by members of the public wishing to help is cash donations to the 
charity of their choice” (COA 2005a). 
  
The implication for donors is that these organisations all have government approval 
and are fitting recipients of their cash. However, many of these agencies do not have 
recognised external credibility. The results in Table 2 show that more than one-third 
of agencies were not members of ACFID or accredited with the AusAID program.   
 
 
TABLE 2: ACCREDITATION WITH ACFID AND AUSAID  
 ACFID 
n = 34 
AusAID 
n =34 
Accredited  22 21 
Not accredited 12 13 
 
 
RQ 2: Use of donations 
Most agencies specified how they would use the donations raised in the appeal. Three 
other agencies, although not specific, explained the nature of the local organisation in 
the tsunami-affected areas to which they would be sending the funds. However, two 
agencies, Muslim Aid Australia and Royal Thai Consulate-General (Tsunami Appeal) 
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made no attempt on their websites to indicate how money would be spent, but merely 
asked for donations and provided bank details for deposits.  
 
 
TABLE 3: INFORMATION REGARDING USE OF DONATIONS BY AID 
AGENCIES 
 ACFID accredited
n = 22 
Non- ACFID accredited
n = 12 
Specific information provided in 
relation to tsunami appeal  
21 8 
Only general areas in which agency 
worked  
1 2 
No information on use of donations - 2 
 
 
RQ 3: Application of excess donations 
Only three agencies reported what they would do with any excess funds raised, as 
shown in Table 4. One of these, Medecins Sans Frontieres announced that it had put 
its tsunami appeal on hold. Having reached its target of $1 million within two days, it 
was still accepting donations but would direct them to its general medical aid funds. A 
spokesman said: “It is our feeling that to continue accepting donations for the 
emergency appeal at this point would violate our ethical standards of transparency and 
accountability and indeed our responsibility to our donors” (ABC Online 2005a).This 
information was also reported on the agency’s website. 
 
 
TABLE 4: INFORMATION REGARDING APPLICATION OF EXCESS 
DONATIONS 
 ACFID accredited 
n = 22 
Non- ACFID accredited 
n = 12 
Information provided 3 0 
No information provided  19 12 
 
 
Another of the three, ADRA Australia, revealed on its website that “all funds 
collected during the tsunami appeal will be used for emergency relief and 
rehabilitation projects in tsunami affected areas” and that this was possible because it 
had a number of “implementing offices” in tsunami-affected areas which would be 
“constantly identifying needs and developing project ideas”. The third agency, Baptist 
World Aid Australia, stated: “All funds designated for the Tsunami Relief appeal will 
go towards that appeal. As this will be an ongoing project over the next 5 to 10 years, 
we do not expect that we will have more money than we need”. 
 
Of the 31 agencies that did not reveal where they would direct excess funds, 12 were 
members of ACFID, whose code requires that this information be specifically stated 
in an appeal to ensure that all donors know what is happening. One organisation, 
World Vision, appeared to realise this omission from its appeal because its 
spokesperson, Belinda Richardson, later told The Age (5 January 2005) that they 
“could never have enough money for this particular appeal . . . we will never close the 
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appeal”. Such belated comments to the press, while laudable, do not meet the 
accountability requirements under the ACFID code.  
 
 
RQ 4: Donations used for disaster relief vs administration 
Information about the percentage of the donations that would be applied to disaster 
relief was directly provided in the appeals of 10 agencies, as shown in Table 5. A 
further six had information elsewhere on their websites about how funds were 
generally distributed, but this data was often embedded in layers and not easy to find. 
The issue of most concern is that more than half of the agencies did not specify how 
the funds would be applied.   
 
 
TABLE 5: INFORMATION REGARDING USE OF DONATIONS FOR 
OVERSEAS DISASTER RELIEF VS. ADMINISTRATION 
 ACFID accredited
n = 22 
Non- ACFID accredited
n = 12 
Specific information provided in 
relation to tsunami appeal  
9 1 
Only information on general practices 
of the agency  
3 3 
No information provided 10 8 
 
 
RA 5: Post-tsunami feedback 
To assess feedback provided by aid agencies in relation to tsunami donations, their 
websites were investigated on three occasions — one month, one year and two years 
after the tsunami, the results being summarised in Table 6. Additional sources of data 
were the nine-month and two consolidated reports issued by ACFID.  
 
 
TABLE 6: FEEDBACK PROVIDED ON AGENCY WEBSITES 
 
n = 34 
Yes 
n 
No 
n 
1 month 
Information provided on activities in relation to tsunami donations 20 14 
1 year 
Information provided on activities in relation to tsunami donations 26 8 
Information on distribution of donated funds 15 19 
Appeal specified as still open (yes) or closed (no) 5 13 
Hyperlink to ACFID tsunami report 4 30 
2 years 
2005 annual report available on website 21 13 
Tsunami update — either separately or in annual report 22 12 
Hyperlink to ACFID tsunami report 4 30 
 
 
If donors revisited websites four weeks after the tsunami to obtain updates on what 
had been accomplished with their funds, they would be disappointed. Only 12 of the 
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34 organisations provided feedback after 22 January. A further eight had provided 
information up until 15 January. Thus, more than 40% of the 34 agencies provided no 
feedback to their donors beyond their initial appeal information, with one website 
even having closed down. 
 
During 2005 headlines such as “Tsunami Funds Unaccounted For” (McLean 2005), 
“Trickle of Tsunami Funds Allocated” (Allard 2005) and “Fees Blunt Tsunami 
Donations” (Daily Telegraph 2005) may have raised further concern among donors 
and encouraged them to revisit aid agency websites to read updates. A review of the 
websites of the 34 agencies one year after the tsunami does little to increase 
confidence in the public accountability of these agencies. 
 
Thirty agencies had updated their sites since the end of January, but fewer than half 
provided any feedback after 30 June. The summary of the updated reports in Table 6 
shows that whereas more than three-quarters of the agencies supplied some 
information on the tsunami relief activities in which they had been involved, only 15 
of the 34 actually provided details of how they had distributed the donated funds, if 
they had indeed done so. 
 
ACFID produced two NGO tsunami accountability reports in 2005, detailing 
donations and spending. The first of these (ACFID 2005b), dated 31 March, provided 
information from five of its members, and the second (ACFID 2005c), dated 30 June, 
provided information from 30 members, 23 of which were included in the 34 aid 
agencies on the government tsunami website.3 However, only four of these 23 
provided a link to ACFID’s report, making the information readily accessible to 
donors who may not have otherwise known of the existence of the reports. ACFID’s 
second report indicated that a total of $349.5 million had been donated to these 23 
agencies, of which only $102.6 million (or 29.4%) had been spent by 30 June. Given 
this large balance still to be spent, donors might believe that tsunami appeals had 
closed. Nevertheless, a review of the websites of the 34 aid agencies revealed that five 
appeals were still open; no information was provided by 16. Only 13 agencies told 
donors that their appeals were closed. 
 
In December 2006, ACFID released a two-year report on the response of Australian 
NGOs to the tsunami appeal (ACFID 2006b), providing both a program and a 
financial overview. The financial report indicated that $376.6 million had been 
donated to the 23 agencies who had been listed on the government website, of which 
$233.1 (or 61.9%) had been spent by 30 September 2006, leaving a balance of $143.5 
million (or 38.1% of donations) unallocated.   
 
A review of the websites of the 34 agencies revealed that three had been accredited by 
ACFID after the appeal was first launched, bringing the total to 25, but only four or 
these had supplied a link to the ACFID two-year tsunami report. Twenty-one of the 
34 agencies provided their 2005 annual reports on their websites, and 22 presented a 
tsunami update either in the annual report or as a separate document. Almost one-third 
of the organisations did not provide information to their donors, although most still 
had unallocated funds. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Following the 2004 Asian tsunami, potential donors to relief appeals may have looked 
for a trustworthy source to recommend appropriate aid agencies with proven track 
records of accountability and transparency (Boyd 2003). By establishing a “tsunami 
assistance website” with hyperlinks to 34 organisations which had opened appeals, the 
Australian government provided these agencies with implicit, if not explicit, 
credibility.   
 
This study examined the appropriateness of donors transferring their trust to those 
organisations listed on the Australian government website without doing their own 
research.  The research findings indicate a number of areas in which these agencies 
failed to demonstrate the accountability which is at the basis of the development of 
trust (Robinson 2003, Tucker 2004). These areas include lack of information about 
the way in which the funds would be used, how excess funds would be applied and 
the percentage of donations that would actually be spent on aid rather than on 
administration. Further, the agencies provided limited feedback to the donors and the 
general public. 
 
These results have two immediate implications. The first concerns why these agencies 
were selected to be listed on the official website. It would be understandable if the 
government had listed agencies which were accredited by ACFID — a body validated 
by the fact that its accreditation is a prerequisite for accreditation by the government’s 
own AusAID program.  But more than one-third of the agencies listed on the website 
were not accredited with ACFID.  Inquiries about the criteria used to determine this 
list were met with no response and the list itself was removed by the end of February 
2005. It may be that because the crisis occurred during a holiday period, proper 
authority was neither sought nor obtained for the establishment of the website with its 
list of hyperlinks. However, given that accredited organisations are listed on the 
ACFID website, and that the government has its own list of accredited AusAID 
agencies that could have been included, there seems to be no justification for the 
composition of the government’s tsunami relief website. The government waived its 
normal accountability requirements and provided external credibility to the aid 
agencies listed on its official website, implying to donors that these agencies had been 
approved by the government. It is disappointing that this happened in a time of crisis 
when donors wanted to give but also wanted to know whom they could trust. This 
should prompt the government to ensure the existence of appropriate systems and 
controls will prevent any recurrence of such a failure. 
 
The second implication relates to monitoring by ACFID. Despite the fact that section 
5 of its Code of Conduct specifies fundraising requirements, compliance with these is 
not checked.  Compliance is monitored only by investigation of complaints and by 
examination of annual reports. Yet the ACFID website claims: “The Code offers you 
the assurance that a watchdog is monitoring Australian overseas aid and development 
agencies. Because the Code demands high standards, you can feel reassured that 
organisations are focused on working with integrity and accountability as they support 
poor communities around the world. Signatories are required to publicly report on 
their financial activities using a standardised format in their Annual Report. This 
means it is easy for the public to understand how and where funds are being spent, 
and to make comparisons between agencies” (ACFID 2007). 
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The “demands” of a code which are not monitored do nothing to provide assurance to 
donors that organisations are trustworthy. In October 2005, ACFID released an 
“Emergency Response Checklist” to assist code signatories (ACFID 2006a). The 
checklist restated relevant code sections but nothing was done to ensure that 
compliance occurs. ACFID may be better employed undertaking random audits of 
agencies’ appeals. 
 
Since ACFID monitors annual reports, it is reasonable to assume that all accredited 
agencies will produce them, even if they are not available on agency websites. Thus 
one area for future research is an analysis of the decision-usefulness of these reports. 
However, it is not sufficient for these annual reports merely to disclose financial data 
(Quarter et al 2003, FRBR 2005, Weisinger and Salipante 2005). They should include 
a broader concept of accountability encompassing social capital (Leonard and Onyx 
2005) and aspects of operations including “the people who work for them, 
communities that are affected by them or their products, and the use of public goods, 
such as infrastructure or education and training” (Dellaportas et al 2005, p. 218), so 
that donors can assess whether particular agencies are worthy recipients of their trust 
and their money. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1 By 4 January, a website was launched in Tasmania complete with the Red Cross 
symbol and the logo being used for their Asia Quake and Tsunamis Appeal (Smith 
2005). Before the illegal site was taken off the Web, the designer alleged that he had 
collected $10,000 which would be forwarded to the Australian Red Cross. However, 
another source (Maslog-Levis 2005a) reported that the website had been created in 
order to locate an uncle who was missing in Thailand. By 6 January, Australians were 
beginning to receive e-mails written in a similar tone to the notorious Nigerian e-
mails (Maslog-Levis 2005b). On 7 January, a Queensland man was charged with 
fraudulently collecting tsunami relief funds in three shopping centres while claiming 
he was from the Townsville and Brisbane Hospital foundations (ABC Online 2005c). 
 
2 There were 37 organisations listed on the Australian government’s updated 
“Tsunami Assistance” website (as at 25 January 2005), but three have been omitted 
from the study: ACFID (an accountability watchdog organisation which did not 
launch an appeal), Australian Giving Centre (a page with links to organisations) and 
Sri Lankan Events Calendar (a page with links to community events held to raise 
money for the tsunami appeal). This study investigates the remaining 34 aid agencies. 
   
3 One of the original 34 aid agencies has been accredited by AusAID since the 
tsunami appeal was launched, increasing the number from 22 to 23. 
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